The Cold War and the early post-Cold War periods were relatively easy to define and comprehend. The first was roughly the struggle between two superpowers forming a bipolar system where almost every state had to choose a side. What followed was a period described by Fukuyama as “The End of History” announcing the triumph of liberal ideas. The US was a global hegemon: selecting when to intervene, expanding NATO’s reach, and dominating international institutions. Following the 9/11 attacks unilateralism was exposed and thereafter multilateralism appeared – with its limitations. Today, “regional multilateralism” may be the next paradigm that can bring about peace, cooperation, and stability in global affairs.

The rise and fall of U.S. hegemony during the 1990s has been documented. The Unipolar moment, a Foreign Affairs article by Charles Krauthammer, encapsulates the main point in the title. It was a moment. Once this “moment” was over, Fareed Zakaria and others have been imagining a “post-American world.”

U.S. power and its global role remain at the core of the contemporary discussion. America still is – and probably will remain for a long time – the world’s undisputed leader in military, economic and technological power. However, the politics of austerity at home and pressing realities abroad necessitate a new U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. cannot go it alone.

Indeed, the U.S. has been refocusing its foreign policy and Obama has been using the term multilateralism repeatedly. Multilateralism is a prudent strategy for the U.S. and the international system at large, however it is incomplete. Multilateralism has reached its limits when it comes to Iran’s nuclear program, recognition of Palestine, the six party talks on North Korea, and Kosovo’s independence – to name just a few thorny issues.

In a world of diminished U.S. involvement and unsuccessful multilateralist endeavors, an alternative vision for global engagement is necessary. Instead we are faced with a reluctant China, an unprepared India, an European Union in the midst of a financial debacle and a host of regional powers that focus on their neighborhood rather than claiming a global role. Given these realities, regional multilateralism can serve as the way out from this dead end.

Regionally, the Middle East is as explosive as ever. The Western Balkans are doubtful about their future within the European Union and may again implode. The African continent has many ongoing conflicts and even more potential ones unresolved. In Latin America at least two alternative visions for the region are competing. The Far East is actively searching ways to live with the rise of China. These and other contemporary problems can be better solved at the regional rather than the bilateral or global levels.

This context highlights the importance of regional integration and multilateralism. Regional multilateralism is building on these very ideas. Bringing these two together is necessary in today’s world. The buds of regional integration are everywhere in the making but they have not yet been clearly connected with the principles of multilateralism.

The EU serves as an example of regional integration and others are following its steps. The African Union has also stepped up its peacekeeping efforts and moved toward further economic integration. However, the quest for regional multilateralism should not be confined by a conventional understanding of geography. For instance, Russia may be a force for stability both in the Far East and Central Asia, China may have a stake in the affairs of Latin America and Africa, and different parts of what we call the Middle East may integrate with parts of Central Asia or Europe. The very prospect of Turkey joining the EU may be a sign of such developments.

Cross-regional cooperation is key to regional multilateralism. The transatlantic dialogue model between the U.S. and Europe can and should be exported. For instance, in the Far East the U.S. and the EU both cooperate with ASEAN. China and Russia have extended their ties through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. This however did not prevent Russia from establishing the Eurasian Union, in a way reclaiming its sphere of influence. The Middle East, on the other hand, is in dire need of broader – albeit imaginative – regional integration.

The inability of any one power to confront global challenges will lead responsible powers into the fold of regional multilateralism. The transition will be facilitated if it builds on existing regional integration structures. This way, every state will ultimately become a stakeholder in the international system.

For that to happen, regional leaders need to operate as focal points. They need to listen, persuade and inspire insiders, while coordinating with outsiders. This process is different from the traditional spheres of influence system. It is based not on Monroe Doctrine-type of arrangements and coercion but rather on reassuring security umbrellas and mutually beneficial trade blocs.

Within this new paradigm, emerging regional leaders – such as China, Russia, India, Japan, Brazil, Turkey, and South Africa – will play a more significant role within their regions while at the same time will take part in cross regional and global issues.

* This article first appeared on CNN’s Global Public Square. Harris Mylonas is Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University and Academy Scholar at the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies. Emirhan Yorulmazlar is Fellow at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.

The decision to set up the UN Peacebuilding Commission, Peacebuilding Support Office and Peacebuilding Fund was taken in September 2005 and bit by bit the new architecture was ready for business in 2006 and into 2007. I have just finished four years on the Fund’s independent Advisory Group, the last two as its chair, so here are my reflections.

Money & Achievement

The Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) was set an initial target to raise $250 million. In fact, $290 million rolled in over the first two years, from one of the broadest group of government donors of any UN fund. As a new set of institutions, the peacebuilding architecture got going slowly and one of the sharpest criticisms of the PBF in the first couple of years was that it wasn’t spending enough money quickly enough. That was mostly unfair, not only because the PBF was dependent on the speed and competence with which other parts of the system and would-be beneficiary governments moved, but also because any new institution has teething problems and goes slowly at first (and so it should or the teething will be all the more painful). One result of that initial impatience is that only $137 million more have been donated in the past three years. There has been a sense that some of the donor governments were waiting and seeing.

What they see now should be pretty reassuring. The PBF is a funding agency not an implementation body - it doesn’t do peacebuilding, it finances it – active in about 20 countries at a level that is pushing towards its business plan target of $100 million a year. It can respond to fully-fledged funding proposals in around three weeks and has been known to do it in a few days – unbelievable speed by UN standards. And there is starting to be a reasonable body of evaluation and assessment of the activities it has financed, which, with all the normal caveats in this kind of analysis, identifies broadly positive impact.

A looming, paradoxical shortfall

This positive record makes it all the more worrying and strange that donations to the PBF are picking up only slowly. This year, the downward trend stopped with just over $70 million donated or promised compared to about $37 million in 2010. And some governments are making multi-year commitments which brings the security of predictable funding levels. But at these levels, the PBF is still living on its initial income and is steadily spending it out. Without a significant increase in donations, it’ll have to cut spending to avoid a deficit in 2013.

Of course, a lot of this is down to the combined impact of waves of economic and financial difficulties hitting donor governments. But it would be staggeringly paradoxical if the PBF were to be left under-resourced today. Consider:

1. The experimental period of the PBF is over; the PBF has proven its worth.
2. As a contribution to the security of citizens, countries and regions, peacebuilding is far cheaper than peacekeeping or major humanitarian operations.
3. The need for peacebuilding is not declining.

This paradox is a symptom of a systemic hangover in the UN – the after-effects of early uncertainty about the concept of peacebuilding and the role of the PBF, alongside impatience because it seemed not to get its gears engaged quickly enough.

Starting with uncertainty

The PBF was conceived along the other two pillars of the peacebuilding architecture – the PB Commission and Support Office – by the High Level panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, established by the UN S-G Kofi Annan, with its 2004 report, A more secure world: Our shared responsibility, along with the follow-up response report in 2005 by Kofi Annan, In larger freedom.

The key insight from the High Level Panel was that, though peacebuilding should be seen as an expression of the UN’s core functions of security, human rights and development, it had, thus far, been a missing component from the machinery for securing the basic freedoms from want and from fear. So some new institutional machinery was established to fit in alongside the rest of the UN and focus on peacebuilding.

The term peacebuilding had entered the international vocabulary with Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 report, An agenda for peace. But it didn’t really stick. I realised this when I was commissioned in 2002 by the Norwegian foreign ministry in a project together with the overseas development ministries of Germany (BMZ) and the UK (DFID) and the Dutch foreign ministry to review and evaluate peacebuilding practice. The study set out with the notion that there was a decade’s worth of work to look at and soon tripped over the fact that as late as 2001 and 2002, the high-level adoption of the vocabulary of peacebuilding had had very little traction in on-the-ground practice. My overview report of that study, the so-called Utstein Report* was a small step in early 2004 towards clarifying the meaning of peacebuilding and embedding it in international practice. The significant progress was registered with A more secure world in 2004, In larger freedom in 2005 and later that same year the UN summit that set up the peacebuilding architecture.

So it is not really surprising that as recently as 4-5 years ago, as the UN peacebuilding trio started operating, there was a considerable degree of confusion and uncertainty among different parts of the UN, some donor governments and other multilateral organisations about what peacebuilding was and what the UN PBF was for. Some of this confusion, looking back, was almost certainly deliberate: a turf-based determination among UN agencies to push back the newcomer and, as much as possible, grab hold of the resources allocated to it.

Clarifying peacebuilding

The grounds for this confusion and uncertainty have been steadily dispelled in the intervening years. Key developments have been the EU‘s partial adoption of the vocabulary of peacebuilding in about 2008; major policy statements by governments such as Norway (with a strategic paper in 2004 followed by a number of speeches and statements from ministers from 2006 onwards), Sweden and the UK; and developments in OECD-DAC, in the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, and the World Bank with its 2011 World Development Report.

The precise form peacebuilding takes varies from one country to the next because conditions and needs vary so widely. The core is the effort to assist a country that is in a perilous situation move to a situation of greater safety.

While the idea started in the 1992 report, An agenda for peace, as a way of defining the key long-term, post-conflict task, the chronology has since been widely qualified. Building peace after there has been massive violence is, in part, an effort to prevent a relapse – and in principle and also in terms of many of the detailed activities, that effort is qualitatively no different from what is required to help a country avoid tipping into large scale violence in the first place. If some 40-50 per cent of violent conflicts slide back into violence after agreement, how do you know at any one point whether you are in a pre-war or post-war situation?

Beyond this, the focus in the World Development Report 2011 on large scale violence of any kind, including crime as well as political instability and outright war, together with the experience of the ‘Arab Spring’ in 2011 both suggest that peacebuilding has a much wider relevance than a recent war or its looming threat. In both kinds of countries, albeit in different ways, a core need is to develop reliable institutions for citizens’ access to social participation and a political voice, to justice and fairness, to security and prosperity. This is likewise the core set of tasks in peacebuilding. It is part of building a peaceful state and part of peaceful development – and they are a part of peacebuilding.

As the cogency of peacebuilding has become more widely accepted, its wide-ranging relevance understood, and its correspondingly large variety of means and modalities acknowledged, so also the practice has begun to advance and the body of evaluation literature is beginning to build up and reveal impact. With this, the earlier uncertainty and confusion around peacebuilding have dissipated significantly.

the role of the peacebuilding fund

At its broadest, peacebuilding is the process through which risks to human security are diminished and institutions are built so ordinary people can benefit from well-ordered government, the rule of law and relatively fair access to reasonable levels of prosperity. For unstable and conflict-affected societies, it’s a key pre-condition and an enduring component of equitable development.

It is, furthermore, not only a deep-reaching and wide-ranging process but also long-term. The World Development Report 2011 talks of a 15-30 year time frame.

It is not the role of the UN Peacebuilding Fund, aiming to spend about $100 million a year, to accompany a country the whole way along that road. It is its role, rather, to help start the journey and to come back in along the way to help clear some obstacles that may be encountered.

This means the PBF has to be catalytic. It has to know how to kick-start peacebuilding and unblock the process if and when that’s necessary. In turn that means it has to be quick. The three-week target for turning round applications for funds is both necessary and impressive. At the same time as speed, it needs to be relevant and precisely targeted. For example, it may not just be a question of police reform but of a specific component of police reform in a particular part of the country that is most needed. Knowing that – and knowing that it may be necessary to ask that question – is key.

All these qualities also mean the PBF often has to be innovative – or gently nudge UN in-country teams and would-be beneficiary governments into taking an innovative approach. And with that goes possibly the most difficult part of this array of qualities so the PBF can fulfil its niche role: it needs to be able to take risks. These risks are not the risks of doing direct damage but of not succeeding – of backing your judgement and getting it wrong.

We may think that the only people whose judgement never fails are those don’t use it much – and the same is true of institutions. But that is not much of a defence when a donor government asks about $10 million that has frankly speaking been wasted on poor programming. The PBF’s donors all support the idea that it should be less risk-averse than other parts of the UN system but not many can be relied on if the risk doesn’t pay off.

where things now stand

All that said, there is a pretty good feeling around the PBF at the moment and good reason for that. It is a quick acting, well managed, flexible financial instrument. It is building a decent track record. It has the support of some important donor governments and what it needs now is for some of those who are in the habit of giving it $1-2 million a year to promote themselves to the the 3-5 million range, while some of those at 5 or so push on for the 10 million mark.

It would be a good idea to start a fundraising push with the EU, which so far hasn’t given any money to UN peacebuilding but could, and then with countries whose economies are actually working and growing. China and India are both regular financial supporters of the UN Peacebuilding Fund: now would be a good time to join the ranks of the big donors and the main driving forces.

This article is  published at Dan Smith’s blog and is also published at ELIAMEP’s blog with author’s permission

You may well know that a major feature of history is that it never stops being repeated. Recent British attempts to impose an EU embargo on Iranian oil imports are reminiscent of the Mossadeq crisis (1951-1953). At the time due to Iran’s unilateral decision to nationalize its oil industry, London imposed an all out embargo on Iranian oil sales forcing Iranian Prime Minister Mossadeq to rule Iran without oil income and to rely exclusively on commercial and agricultural profits. This crisis ended with the overthrow of Mossadeq and the restitution of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi through British and US intelligence “Ajax” intervention in Iran. Contemporary developments in British foreign policy on Iran tend to follow more or less the same pattern in terms of goals and methodology.

Yet the world has changed ever since. Although a major world power nowadays, Great Britain does not enjoy the status of the declining superpower after WW2. Islamic Iran is at the peak of its geopolitical influence in the region forming its own geopolitical agenda and investing on various aspects of the foreign policy of the Shah in the Middle East. London on its part attempts to increase its global profile by siding with the goals of Washington. Iran gets increasingly isolated but it is far from being weakened. A common feature between then and now is that the cause of the crisis and the means of Britain to exert pressure on Iran are related to energy.

Regarding the cause of the conflict, it is not oil but the advanced form of the nuclear energy. Iran has the ambition to develop an independent national nuclear programme, preventing any foreign country from monitoring, let alone controlling, its efforts. It is the same nationalistic sentiment that characterized Mohammad Mossadeq’s nationalization of Iranian oil at the expense of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, at a time that no other oil producer in the Middle East had dared to take such a step. Throughout its dispute with certain western countries over its nuclear aspirations, Iran has displayed Mossadeq-style resilience, this time not only against Britain, but mainly to a wider front of western countries under the lead of the US and Israel. This time however, Iran is not alone and this is due to various factors: its geopolitical influence, the systematic Iranian foreign policy and its energy reserves which are vital for many Asian booming economies.

Although it is not the cause of this crisis, crude oil is increasingly becoming for Britain and other major western countries the means to step up pressure on Iran over its nuclear stubbornness and make it comply with western demands. Recent British proposal to the EU member states to stop buying Iranian oil is to this direction. This time London does not have the ability to observe such a ban not any time soon. If London succeeds, then Iran will be forced to find other buyers for the 18% of its total oil production that goes to Europe annually. This is not expected to be a difficult option for Tehran that in the last three decades has been used to acting under various embargoes and restrictions. Asian countries are likely to absorb this amount of oil without any considerable delay. Bu this will not go ahead without major obstacles.

British-Western pressure over the Iranian oil issue is combined with a simultaneous effort to stop any banking transactions between Iranian banks and the rest of the world. Such an effort has already caused major liquidity problems to the Iranian economy. Thus Iran does not rely on banks anymore to get the money for the oil it sells abroad. It sends its own employees to negotiate with the governments and their refineries. This is a complicated and time consuming process but it seems that it pays off in the end for Iran. Recent articles on the case of Greece buying oil from Iran without letters of credit describe the extent of planning, activity and flexibility of the Iranian government in their effort to overcome the western embargo.

Moreover London may not intend to stop there. If an EU Iranian oil embargo is enforced, then Iran will suffer a major, though temporary, economic setback in terms of income. London plans to make the EU Iranian oil embargo gain momentum worldwide could include a move in the UNSC context, highlighting the Iranian nuclear programme as a global threat.

Yet for now the British initiative for an EU embargo on Iranian oil sales has not addressed the need of fragile economies of the European South for Iranian oil and the fact that they cannot find alternative sources for fine quality oil in reasonable prices. As long as Saudi Arabia or other countries cannot replace the quantity of Iranian oil which is sold to Europe in a good price, then British efforts will not pay off. And even if the latter issue is addressed, London, Washington and Tel Aviv have a long way to go before, if ever, convincing Beijing and Moscow to expand the EU embargo. Moreover, the isolation of Britain in the recent EU summit over the Eurozone is expected to weaken London’s initiative over Iran in the EU context.

In the suburb of Qulhak in northern Tehran there is a beautiful garden covering almost two big blocks full of poplar trees. It is the garden of the British Embassy in Tehran. The site came under British ownership after WW2 and ever since it has been a place for recreation for the British diplomats serving in Iran as well as for Iranianists visiting the country. In 1977 the British Institute of Persian Studies was established in the Qulhak compound. Along with the HQ of the British Embassy in the Ferdowsi Street at the city centre the Qulhak garden are the two British diplomatic compounds in Tehran. Expectedly enough in times of deterioration, and they are many after 1979, of bilateral relations, the Qulhak garden has become a hotspot for Iranian demonstrations. Whenever the HQ British Embassy compound becomes a target of demonstrators, the Qulhak garden follows suit. The same happened in the assault on the British Embassy yesterday.

The Iranian government and establishment have never acknowledged full British ownership over the British garden, claiming that the British Embassy does not have complete legal documents of ownership. The British disagree claiming the opposite. What is interesting in this process is that the Iranian establishment, through the Parliament, decided to highlight this issue after 2005. Ever since the prospect of having Iran repossessing the garden appears more and more likely, following the deteriorating status of Iranian-British relations. In the same framework it is noteworthy that the British Institute of Persian Studies has been underactive in recent years.

The storming of the UK Embassy in Tehran yesterday by Iranian students was combined with a parallel assault on the Qulhak garden compound. These assaults are of unprecedented nature and extent for the relations between the two countries and result from the British policy to sanction Iran economically by cutting every economic tie with Tehran. The Iranian Parliament voted three days ago for downgrading bilateral diplomatic ties and then the assaults occurred.

The style of the Iranian attack on both compounds resembles that of the US Embassy in Tehran in 1979. In the last few years various articles in Iranian newspapers, such as Keyhan, had repeatedly called for taking strict measures, even cutting diplomatic ties with Britain. Anti-Britain sentiment in Iran has been running high since the late 19^th century due to various British economic colonial-style interventions in Iran, such as the Tobacco Monopoly, the exploration of oil reserves, the elevation of the Pahlevi dynasty in Iran (1926), the Mossadeq crisis (1953) and others.

These attacks did not catch Britons by surprise. They were aware of the dangerous situation for their diplomatic staff and they are on guard. The Foreign Office protested to the Iranian Foreign Ministry in Tubkhane and the latter has expressed regret over the incidents. Today London announced the withdrawal of the British diplomats from Iran and warned of retaliatory measures against Iran. The Iranian foreign ministry has not commented on these developments yet.

If London is determined to continue supporting vividly the US policy for the economic and political isolation of Iran, it is expected that bilateral dies will be damaged further, leading even to their disruption for a period of time. The recent British move to cut economic ties with the banking system and the petrochemical industry of Iran is indeed an aggressive act against Iran. In the past hardliners in Tehran have repeatedly called for the end of diplomatic relations with London. Now they have a good reason for enhancing their attitude in this regard.

The ongoing developments are dramatic and they are interconnected with the Iranian nuclear issue, the Syrian crisis and eventually the Palestinian case. The assaults on the British diplomatic mission in Iran have been a signal to London by Tehran that it can reciprocate and it is ready to cut diplomatic ties with London in the foreseeable future, if a hostile British policy persists. In this case the British Garden in Qulhak, could have the fate of the US Embassy compound in Tehran.

After nine months Syria’s ongoing conflict between the pro-Assad and anti-Assad forces has reached a stall-mate. No side seems to be willing to compromise; the revolutionaries remain firm in their principles and goal to overthrow Assad, despite their casualties which they suffer in the hands of the Syrian army. Assad, on his part, remains adamant in his policy, considering the demonstrators as a threat to his rule which serves the stability and existence of his country.

The ongoing conflict leads also to the gradual destabilization of Syria and the region.  Thus neighboring countries have been quite concerned about the Syrian crisis. Expectedly enough those regional governments that have pursued an anti-Assad policy for years have sided with the revolutionaries. Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey have repeatedly asked Assad to proceed to the liberalization of his political system, even to step down immediately. By contrast Assad’s foreign allies, such as Iran and Lebanon’s government and Hezbollah have openly supported Assad, urging him to proceed to reforms but under his rule. On its part Baghdad has kept a low profile, adopting a wait and see policy. Tel Aviv, Assad’s lethal enemy, sees the Syrian chaos with cautious satisfaction, wishing to see Assad’s downfall but is concerned about the eruption of a civil war. In any case Israel is the only regional country which has already benefited from Assad’s inability to promote his anti-Israel policy.

Day by day the crisis in Syria gets worse, throwing the whole country into chaos. The prospects of an all out civil war are growing. Indeed judging from the modus operandi of the revolutionaries and the government, both sides are ready to either achieve their political goals or throw Syria into a civil war. If such a scenario unfolds, it is interesting to examine the operational plan of the revolutionaries.

So far the revolt has spread in various cities of the country. Yet the strongholds of the revolutionaries have been the restive cities of Homs, Hama and Deraa. Homs and Hama are of paramount importance due to their strategic position both for the sea access of Damascus and the north-south national highway network. In case they fall into revolutionary hands, then Damascus could be cut off from the northern part of the country.  The first goal of the revolutionaries is to control these two cities and then spread their control to the north in order to isolate Damascus from its sea access to the ports of Latakia, Tartus, Jableh and Baniyas. Such a development could only be achieved with the support of the West who could adopt partially the modus operandi in Libya. In this respect the West could impose a sea blockade on Syrian ports, preventing Damascus from receiving any provisions in basic types of foodstuffs, medical products and weaponry. A sea-blockade combined with a non-fly zone operated by a multinational force and a buffer zone in the north observed by Ankara would boost the efforts of the revolutionaries to control the north of the country. In such a case Aleppo would become the operational centre of the revolutionaries in the north. In this process there are two critical issues: first, what would happen in the Euphrates region with regard to the Kurds in the north and the eastern borders of Syria with Iraq. Second, in case Assad receives provisions through Lebanon, would Israel be willing to initiate a conflict with Hizbullah? In both cases Assad would rely heavily on his allies in case he came under sea and air blockade.

From the above analysis it is evident that if a civil war erupts in Syria, it will be enduring, multidimensional and large in scale. The key factor in this process is the loyalty of the Syrian army to President Assad. So far the Syrian army has been loyal to Damascus but in recent days various incidents of desertion have displayed a change of mind in some of the regiments of the Syrian army. If so, the prospect of a dichotomized Syria for a short or long period, or even permanently, could not be disregarded. What is certain in the Syrian crisis is that, if the country falls into a civil war, then it will affect the stability of the whole region, from the Mediterranean shores to the Persian Gulf and the Qandil Mountains to the Gulf of Aqaba.

Contemporary political developments in the Arab world are crucial for the future of the region and the EU seems to be deeply concerned. The unprecedented crisis various Arab governments face as well as the way that protests are unfolded and spread at a time of deep economic crisis in the southern EU member states can become a source for trouble and instability for the latter and the EU as a whole. Recent events in Spain clearly suggest that protesters in Madrid have been creatively adopted the Tahrir Square model of protests. Regardless of the different political heritage between the northern and southern Mediterranean coasts, it becomes evident that in modern global communication can facilitate political interaction between different cultures. East and West has always been the model of global antagonism and Islam is the driving force in the Middle East.

In contrast to the orientalistic concept, according to which Islam is a unchangeable and non-progressive cultural entity, Islamic societies have shown historically a stable and dynamic evolution in all fields including economy. Recent political events in the Middle East, linked to ongoing economic and social developments, verify this argument.

The aforementioned orientalistic approach stems from the geopolitically and technologically decadent state of the Islamic world over the past four centuries, a period coinciding with the political empowerment of the Christian and Western world in general. Yet the Islamic world has its own dynamics, dictating developments in the region. The ongoing political upheavals in the Arab world are inextricably related to inner economic developments which result from global economic and cultural processes.

Over the past two decades, Islamic societies in every country in the Middle East have witnessed unprecedented urban economic and technological growth. Foreign investment and Internet contact have altered living standards and the world view of the population respectively. The economic contact between the Muslim world and the international investment centers has caused the aforementioned unprecedented urban economic development. The advent of capitalism has changed the living standards of the average middle class that seeks to share the international capitalist urban lifestyle. A key part of this lifestyle is the use of Internet and whatever that means culturally.

Part of this cultural process is the political worldview of the emerging Muslim middle class. The interaction between the middle class and the international online environment results in the adoption of liberal ideas by the newly formed bourgeoisie, bringing the latter in direct clash with the political status quo in their country.

In the last century the majority of Arab countries are run under a pro-West secular authoritarian political system administration. This hybrid political system cannot be identified neither with the Western nor the Islamic political tradition. The well-established governments are currently viewing with concern the ideological demands of the emerging bourgeoisie for political reforms and freedoms. The result of the ideological conflict between the existing political system and the urban middle class is their open clash in the streets of major cities, except Libya, where a civil war conflict is underway. A series of key questions rise from the ongoing crisis in the Arab world. A key question in this process is whether the protagonists of the new urban middle class represent the majority of the population in their country. This issue stems from the relationship between the newly emerged middle class and the Islamists as well as the fact that economic developments and the online world have not reached the majority of the rural population. In particular, the case of Egypt is quite revealing.

Most analysts have termed the Egyptian revolt as a result of the internet communication between the emerging middle-class urban youth and this seems to be quite the case. Yet, in terms of numbers it could be suggested that the protesters in the major cities of Egypt were not more than the 10%, at the very best, of the total population of the country. The vast majority of the rural population living at a state of severe poverty did not participate in the protests since they do not share the same living standards as their compatriots in the cities do. They do not have internet access and they are not in touch with the rest of the world. This silent majority seems to be the key-player for future political developments in the country. As shown below, their support for Islam as the only political power for the future of Egypt poses a great challenge for the nationalists and the secular elite of the country.

Given the above differentiation a key question is raised by the attitude of the representatives of the existing political system toward the reformists, and whether the former will concede to reforms. The Army in Egypt is the major driving force for handling the transition to a more liberal political system. Yet the clear differentiation between the rising urban middle class and the Islamists in Egypt is a major card in the hands of the military in order to balance every political tendency and keep the situation under control. The army has not convinced yet the protesters that they will keep their promises. For the military elite worries that any liberalization of the political system may backfire and may lead the country to destabilization. The main reason for their concern is the overwhelming power of the Islamic Brotherhood.

In this process the main question is whether these reforms will be the launch pad for the political liberalization of Arab societies or a Trojan horse their further Islamization by the conservatives in rural and large part of urban areas. So far the Islamic Brotherhood has supported the revolt and has adopted a wait and see policy regarding both the Mubarak regime and the army as well as the demands of the secular protesters. Islamists have participated in the protests but they have not been the spearhead. The army is aware of the Islamists’s intentions and this is perhaps the major reason for not pursuing reforms faster. Undoubtedly the military pursues a reform policy in Egypt and the system will alter in part but not essentially Yet, under these circumstances it is very unlikely that essential political reforms may occur. In a wider context the Arab world has entered a new phase in its modern history. Secular and conservative powers are expected to be the driving levers for political renovation of the various Islamic societies, exerting influence beyond the region, including the southern EU member states.

Increasing consumption of water packaged in plastic containers in Cypriot and other Mediterranean countries continues to compete with tap water for the most popular water source of potable use, cooking, and beverage preparations (cold/hot coffee, tea and juices). A general notion in the Cypriot society calls for precautionary measures against packaged water quality deterioration during container exposure to high temperatures and/or extended sun (UV) radiation, because they are considered as important factors of plastic constituent leaching into water. Newly published research by the prestigious Water Research Journal shows for the first time that frequency of container re-use, neither temperature, nor UV exposure duration was the most significant factor in maximizing chemical leaching from polyethylene terephthalate (PET, Plastic Identification Code #1, 1.5L) and polycarbonate (PC, Plastic Identification Code #7, 19L) types of water containers (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0043135411005884).

The research team of the Cyprus International Institute for Environmental and Public Health (CII) under the auspices of the Cyprus University of Technology (CUT) partnered with faculty from Harvard School of Public Health (HSPH) to investigate the comparative influence of frequency of re-use, temperature and UV exposure duration on antimony and bromine leaching from plastic water containers. Even under ambient temperatures and no UV exposure (stored in dark conditions), frequency of reuse significantly (p<0.001, 95% confidence level) increased the magnitude of chemical leaching into packaged water.

The research team led by assistant professor, Konstantinos C. Makris, post-doctoral researcher, Syam S. Andra, and HSPH faculty member James P. Shine reported for the first time that the number of times a plastic container was reused mostly determined the magnitude of antimony and bromine compounds leaching into water. Plastic constituents such as antimony and bromine compounds, like polybrominated diphenyl ethers (PBDEs) are widely used as PET polymerization catalyst and flame retardants, respectively, posing a serious health risk under conditions that enhance their leaching into packaged water. In developing countries, plastic containers are extensively re-used for solar disinfection treatment of microbial-contaminated water via the placement of contaminated water in plastic containers under the sun for a specific period of time (SODIS treatment). Research has shown that microbes and viruses are eliminated from the SODIS-treated water allowing its subsequent potable use, but little is known about possible chemical leaching under the aforementioned conditions, which were explored in our study.

Ongoing research in Prof. Makris’ lab attempts to quantify the magnitude and uncertainty associated with leaching of organic plasticizers used in water containers, such as bisphenol A, phthalates, and PBDE compounds held responsible for possible endocrine disrupting health effects in humans. Currently, no acceptable daily dose estimates exist for oral ingestion of organo-brominated (PBDEs), or other plasticizers/additives organic compounds if they were to be found in bottled water at much lower concentrations. The dilemma about recycling promotion of plastic containers versus extensive re-use and the possible health hazards associated with bottle reuse needs to be evaluated under a holistic approach. Suggestive intervention measures focus on reducing the number of times plastic containers are re-used, while also caution should be exercised in minimizing container exposure to heat and sunshine (UV radiation).

  In today’s Turkish economic reality various forms of accumulated and constantly increasing capital coexist, which should firstly be analysed theoretically and concisely, so that they become absolutely comprehensible in terms of their significance, their interconnection and their expressions.

Firstly we make a distinction between the Islamic or green capital on the one hand and the kemalic capital or military – bureaucratic capital on the other, as they were formed in the modern Turkish political and economic history. Capitalism in Turkey is split into two different forms, with distinct mentalities and textures: the Islamic and kemalic capitalism. A mainly political juxtaposition smoulders among them, due to the different political bases they stand on and which they draw their strength from, and the distinct political and economic aims that each one serves. Practically however, due to the more general economic and socio-political conditions as well as certain particular factors prevailing in Turkey today which co-shape the country’s future course and prospect, the following five types of accumulated capital have been created in the Turkish economy of today:

1.)        The kemalic or military – bureaucratic capital which the Turkish mostly military companies and defensive industries come under, for example, the Turkish Army Solidarity Institution (Ordu Yardιmlaşma Kurumu, Ο.Υ.Α.Κ.), though which the Turkish armed forces perform their business activities. The Ο.Υ.Α.Κ. controls the production of military and martial material (of an enormous economic value), and even entire car industries, while it simultaneously also participates in the Istanbul Stock Exchange^[2] as a shareholder. This particular form of capital is supported by Turkish Industrialist’s and Businessmen’s Association, which in Turkish but also internationally is called TÜSİAD (Türkiye Sanayici ve İş Adamlarι Derneği). The particular business Association finances and is financed by Turkish government military bureaucrats as for example diplomats of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, judges, higher and senior officials, rectors of Academic Institutions, the majority of the hierarchically inferior state officials of Turkey, high-ranking military officials and kemalist ideologists^[3].

2.)        The Islamic or green capital which includes Turkish enterprises, managed by Islamists or businessmen with Islamic ideologies and ideologists of the Islamic religion. Representatives of the large Turkish capital belong to the Islamic capital, as for example the Turkish heavy industries of various production fields, the oil exporting and refining companies such as TÜPRAŞ, the manufacturing sector, the Press groups, construction companies etc. The business representatives of this type of capital formed a dynamic, national, middle class which was created in Turkey after the 1930’s; it gradually acquired political power, it was politically expressed by the various Islamic political parties – formations, particularly by the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkιnma Partisi, AKP) and has important economic influence; As a consequence of the above, it seeks its total disengagement from the kemalists – and has achieved it to a large extent nowadays. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan himself participates in the Boards of Directors’ of large Turkish companies and companies of Islamic interests, such as Ülker. However, other powerful politicians also have business activities in Turkey. The MÜSIAD Organisation (Müstakil Sanayici ve Işadamları Derneği) is the organised business arm of the Islamic capital of Turkey, which numbers more than 7000 companies as members^[4].

3.)        The capital that springs from and is shaped by the large Turkish conglomerates and holdings eg. Koç Holding, Sabancι Holding, Doğan Holding, Karamehmet Holding, Ören (Ihlas Holding), Zorlu Holding, Anadolu Holding, Çukurova Group, Sabaz Holding, Haz Holding etc. These groups maintain very close relations with every government in power, but also with the political parties which play a leading role in the political chessboard of Turkey in general. Certain groups represent exclusively Islamic political and financial interests, like the Karamehmet group, while its opposing force is the Koç group, which is driven by the kemalic ideology and principles, because in the group’s initial creation stage Koç was offered the undivided support of Mustafa Kemal himself, thus acquiring important interconnections with the Turkish army and offering its enterprising contribution in the Turkish defence industries, obtaining enormous economic profits and privileges.

4.)        The capital that is created by the outlaw – illegal activities of the Turkish grey economy such as drug trafficking (mainly opium), weapon trafficking, white slave trade (trafficking of women), prostitution etc. and constitutes a remarkable percentage of the Turkish G.N.P., whose percentage point contribution is of course not possible to be accurately calculated.

5.)        The foreign capital, which flows into the country:

a.) either as foreign financial aid eg. loans from the European Union (E.U.), the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.) and the World Bank, as well as various subsidies – grants for specific fields or sectors of the Turkish economy.

b.) or as Foreign Direct Investments (F.D.I.) which take place in Turkey from foreign countries, which foresee economic surplus values and satisfactory to high returns on investments in various fields of the rapidly developing Turkish economy and particularly in the secondary and tertiary sector (heavy industry, manufacturing, services etc.).

The main contribution of the present article lies in the economic model that will be used in order to describe the Turkish economic growth, but also in order to scientifically justify the theory of the “communicating vessels”. According to this theory which the writer develops, with the use of the economic model in question, the powerful economic, political and military interconnection between the U.S.A., Israel and Turkey is supported and scientifically proven; to a great extent, this interconnection moves the political and economic threads in the broader region of the Eastern Mediterranean, of the Balkans and Hypercaucasia, by influencing the various developments that take place in the regions previously mentioned. The final goal of this “special relation” between these three states is on the one hand to serve U.S.A.’s and Israel’s political and economic interests in the sensitive regions of the Balkans (particularly in the economies of the New Europe) and of the Middle East, and on the other hand to promote Turkey to a regional economic and political power, which shall play a leading role in the various and multifunctional political and economic developments. This “special” relation and the overall project and the individual objectives that are sought to be achieved with the rational application of the “communicating vessels’ ” theory are supported significantly by Great Britain, which offers its assistance to the U.S.A. and Israel, because it perennially foresees economic and political interests in the regions of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans.

More specifically, first we shall explain the various endogenous and exogenous variables that shall be presented in the model.

Therefore,

TD: Turkish development (endogenous variable)

IC: Islamic capital (endogenous variable)

MBC: military – bureaucratic capital (endogenous variable)

FFA: foreign financial aid and Foreign Direct Investments (F.D.I.) in Turkey (exogenous variable)

UF: unexpected or random factors (eg. Financial crises – recessions, foreign exchange or oil crises, stock exchange rises or falls, international crises etc.)

L: Turkish labour, labour force (endogenous variable)

Τ: time or technological advancement (endogenous variable)

It is pointed out that the sum of (IC + MBC) constitutes the entire Turkish capital (TC), in which we do not include any exterior help, financing etc. Additionally, we should mention that the variable nature or land (NL) is not included in the present model only for reasons of simplifying it. Moreover, in most economic growth models the variable in question is omitted in the analysis carried out.

General Model:  TD = IC + MBC+ L + T + FFA + UF

                             — Internal —             — External —

 

Model specialized on the Turkish economy:

 

TD = a + b + c + d + L + T   è 

TD = a(1 – C) + bC+ c₁(1-A) + c₂A + d + L + T   (1),

where:

C: total Turkish capital (internal)

A: foreign financial aid and Foreign Direct Investments (F.D.I.) in Turkey (external)

c₁: foreign financial aid (eg. European Investment Bank) and Foreign Direct Investments (F.D.I.) in Turkey from the European Union.

c₂: foreign financial aid (eg. World Bank, International Monetary Fund etc.) and Foreign Direct Investments (F.D.I.) in Turkey from the U.S.A.

By differentiating the relation (1) as for the variable T, we have:

(θ symbolizes the partial derivative)

dTD/dt = θ{α(1-C)}/dt + θ(bC)/dt + θ{c₁(1-A)}/dt + θ(c₂A)/dt + θd/dt + θL/dt + θt/dt

                                                          —  =1  —

          The model – theoretical fabrication of Harrod and Domar considers growth^[5] is a result only of capital accumulation, thus totally excluding any effect technology and technological progress could have on economic growth. On the other hand, the Denison and Solow model has been developed, which takes into consideration both the effect of labour and capital, and the contribution of technology and technological change on economic growth having “growth accounting” as its foundation. Driven by the Denison and Solow model on the economic growth of an economy, we can distinguish the contribution of various factors in Turkey’s economic growth^[6].

In particular, we assume the model Υ = F (C,L,T) ,

where:

C: the total Turkish capital

L: the total Turkish labour force

Τ: technological advancement

By differentiating as for T we have:

dY/dT = (θF/θC)(dC/dT) + (θF/θL)(dL/dT) +(θF/θT) (dT/dT)

 —  =1  —

By dividing by Y, and by developing the two first terms on the right, we are given the following:

(dY/dT)(1/Y) = (1/Y){(θF/θC)(dC/dT)(1/C) + (θF/θL)(dL/dT)L(1/L) + (θF/θT)}

                              —  =1  —

è

(dY/dT)/Y = (θF/θC)(C/Υ)(dC/dT)/C +  (θF/θL)(L/Y)(dL/dT)/L + (θF/θT)/Y , where:

(dY/dT)/Y is the growth rate of the total Turkish output (g)

(dC/dT)/C is the growth rate of the Turkish capital (g_c)

(dL/dT)/L the growth rate of the Turkish labour force (g_L)

(θF/θC) stands for the marginal product of the Turkish capital (i)

(θF/θL) stands for the marginal product of the Turkish labour (w)

(θF/θC)(C/Υ) stands for the share of the Turkish capital in the Turkish national output (w_c)

(θF/θL)(L/Y) stands for the share of the Turkish labour in the Turkish national output (w_L)

(θF/θT)/Y stands for the share of the increase in the Turkish output (G.N.P.) that is not explained by the increase of the Turkish factors of production (labour and capital). It constitutes that is, the more efficient Turkish production (q)

Therefore,

g = g_c w_c + g_L w_L + q + FF   (2)

where:

FF is the total of external – foreign capital (except the Turkish ones) that flow into the Turkish economy as foreign financial aid (World Bank, I.M.F. European Investment Bank etc.)

The sum of the two mathematical products g_C w_C + g_L w_L constitutes the share of the increase in the Turkish product (G.N.P.) that is explained by the increase in the factors of production (labour and capital). This concerns the growth realised by the factors of production which Turkey self-dependently disposes without any exterior, material or financial aid. This share of Turkish growth marks a rapid increase during the last decades, a fact primarily due to the rise of industrial production and the improvement of working terms – conditions in the secondary and tertiary sector of the Turkish economy.

Relation (2) can also be written more analytically as follows:

g = g_C w_C + g_L w_L + q + WB + IMF + EIB + LOB   (3)

where:

WB stands for the financing inflows from the World Bank

IMF stands for the financing inflows from the I.M.F.

EIB stands for the financing inflows from the European Investment Bank

LOB stands for the financing inflows from the various lobbies activated outside Turkey such as the Turkish lobby of the U.S.A., the “American friends of Turkey”, the American-Jewish lobby etc.

          The basic conclusion that arises from the above analysis firstly concerns the various internal interconnections of the national, Turkish capital with endogenous factors that co-form Turkey’s entire economic capital (eg. kemalic, Islamic capital, capital of the large conglomerates and holdings etc.), and secondly the exterior interconnections of the national, Turkish capital with the international, globalised economic capital (eg. Capital flows from international economic organisations, the E.U., U.S.A., various lobbies etc.). The five types of capital previously mentioned recommend the five constituents that lead to their common resultant which is the accumulation of capital in modern Turkey. This accumulation is characterized as a constant, continual and increasing one, particularly during the last years, after the rise of Tayyip Erdoğan’s Islamic party (AKP) to power in 2002. The stable economic policy it applies consists in an effort to stabilise the economy in macroeconomic terms, to tame inflation and unemployment, to reduce deficits and public debts, and to gradually increase the F.D.I. in the Turkish territory and cease Turkey’s dependency on foreign countries’ energy reserves (eg. oil, natural gas etc.).

          From an economic standpoint, it is made certain through the model which was used that a continuous economic growth of Turkey both in terms of growth rate and time frame requires both capital exposure investments as well as capital intensive investments. The continuous technological advancement that the Turkish economy demonstrates primarily over the recent years, consists in the adoption of new and pioneering methods and production techniques for the products and services it produces, as well as in the advancement of the new product and services development process. Moreover, the technological development contributes decisively to compensate the relation between the Turkish capital and its declining return, based on the fundamental economic law of decreasing rate of return, as the available reserve of the Turkish capital is constantly increasing.

It would of course be sounder and scientifically documented if we could separate with numerical data and calculate the contribution percentage of the Islamic and military – bureaucratic capital to Turkey’s economic growth (eg. marginal product and marginal efficiency of the Islamic and military- bureaucratic capital), so that we are fully aligned with the requisitions of the economic theory as well. This is considered to be unattainable, because no similar studies have been carried out by Turkish or international centres or institutions of economic studies, while even the writer’s efforts to gather this material led to failure due to the difficulty to locate appropriate scientific evidence. Additionally, we could establish the effect of the two types of the Turkish capital in terms of trade, in the conduct of monetary, fiscal as well as exchange – rate policy. However, these issues do not fall into the scientific content of the present article, but may constitute future scientific – research activities.

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^[1] Green is a symbolic colour in the Religiology of Islam, because it represents the beginning of the Holy War of Muslims against the infidels, which is called “Jihad”. For the semantics of the term “green” in the Islamic culture and theory also see Oran V. (2001), “Kemalism, Islamism and Globalization: A Study on the Focus of Supreme Loyalty in Globalizing Turkey”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 1, No. 3, 20-50, p. 45.

^[2] For a more complete analysis of the role of the military – bureaucratic capital and the defensive – military industries and groups in the economic life of Turkey see Incel A., Bairamoglou A., “The Turkish Army. A political party, a social order”, Vivliorama Editions – (Ινσέλ Α., Μπαϊράμογλου Α. «O Τουρκικός Στρατός. Ένα πολιτικό κόμμα, μια κοινωνική τάξη», Εκδόσεις Βιβλιόραμα), Athens, 2007, p. 223-267.

^[3] For more information see http://www.tusiad.org.tr.

^[4] For more information see http://www.musiad.org.tr.

^[5] For a more extensive analysis concern the long-lasting growth see Dornbusch R., S. Fischer. Macroeconomic, Critical, Scientific Library – (Μακροοικονομική, Κριτική, Επιστημονική Βιβλιοθήκη), Athens, 1993, pp. 867-909.

^[6] For an introductory analysis concerning the Denison and Solow model cf. Dornbusch R., S. Fischer. Macroeconomic, Critical, Scientific Library – (Μακροοικονομική, Κριτική, Επιστημονική Βιβλιοθήκη), Athens, 1993, pp. 873 – 876. For a completely scientific analysis of the particular model also see Romer D. Advanced Macroeconomics, The McGraw – Hill Companies, Inc., U.S.A., 1996, pp. 5 – 33.

Thomas Friedman, the father of Neoliberalism, was an intelligent man without doubt. Already in 1982 he had realized that in order for the citizens of any given state to be persuaded to give up on the welfare provisions they were enjoying, a kind of an emergency situation had to be created: “a crisis –real or perceived” as he had described it. The reason is simple: “…in moments of crisis people are willing to hand over a great deal of power to anyone who claims to have a magic cure”, Naomi Klein explains in her “Shock Doctrine”.  Such a climate of emergency situation –I argue- is exactly what the Greek government has been trying to create ever since its election two years ago.

Giorgos Papandreou government was elected in October 2009 on a very promising agenda claiming to invest in human capital, create job opportunities and promote “green development”, since “free market has shown its limits”. Neoliberal policies, according to PASOK’s electoral program, had resulted in “fragile and ever shrinking development, undermined labour rights and welfare state, degraded market-regulating mechanisms, sale out of public wealth and environmental degradation”. Yet, almost two years later, the same government is fully embracing exactly the same neoliberal policies it was denouncing. How did that happen?

On April 23, 2010, Giorgos Papandreou sent a dramatic televised message to the Greek citizens from the harbor of Kastelorizo island: “…our ship is sinking” he said, and we have to turn to our counterparts, the IMF and the EU who will provide us with “a safe harbor, where we can rebuild our ship”. Greece’s self-destructive dance with the Troika had just begun.

Apparently, Dominique Strauss Kahn, head of the IMF at the time, openly admitted in a televised interview a year later, that Papandreou had contacted him in November 2009 already, and they had been working together secretly, with Papandreou not revealing it to the public for political reasons. The results of that secret work became immediately obvious though: The Greek government, through its representatives, embarked on a campaign to find a scapegoat for the crisis and what they chose was the “huge, ineffective and malfunctioning” public sector and the “luxurious” (!) welfare provisions the citizens were enjoying. The problem of course, was followed by the solution: wage cuts, fewer civil servants, extension of the retirement age, privatization of State Owned Enterprises and land. All, in the name of attracting foreign investments- and when you intend to sell, you have to make your merchandise look more attractive after all!

The truth is that neither the public sector nor the welfare regime were responsible for the crisis. According to the ILO (latest available data, 2006), the percentage of employees in the Greek public sector lies at E.U average, being considerably smaller than the French or the Dutch for example. Therefore, the Greek public sector ineffective and malfunctioning as it may be, it certainly is not huge, while the Greek welfare regime already is one of the weakest in Europe. Why did the government choose them to put the blame on then? The answer is simple: in order to implement the Troika’s orders, the government had agreed to introduce cuts in the welfare provisions, and in order to privatize state owned enterprises it had also agreed to “get rid of” around 45.000 civil servants. Τhe propaganda worked: according to a poll conducted by Public Issue for Kathimerini newspaper, in May 2011 74% of the Greeks considered that privatizations were necessary, while 59% had a negative opinion of the public sector.

A few weeks later, the IMF’s, the EU’s and the ECB’s pressure intensified. It was made public that in order for the 5^th installment of the loan to be paid to Greece, the government would have to speed up with its privatization plans (which apparently are not expected to have any substantial effect on the debt reduction anyway) and should have started the relevant procedures by July 2011. Not coincidentally, the –then-  Minister of the Economy Mr Papakonstantinou rushed to announce on a televised interview that the Greek economy would only have funds available until July 2011, unless it received the 5^th installment.

The protestors of the squares of Greece have a different perspective though. They believe that while PASOK’s government is always up to implement the Troika’s orders, it hasn’t been equally willing to meet the demands of its citizens: to establish an Independent Audit Committee for the debt, to find out what part of it is odious, what part of it is illegitimate and product of corruption and –thenafter- to prioritize what part of the debt it can afford to pay back without compromising the wellbeing of its citizens. And –of course- to stop its “privatize everything” campaign, regarding which it also lacks democratic legitimacy, since it was never voted for.

The Greek parliament has approved the new set of austerity measures and the privatization legislation with a robust margin. But unfortunately even this victory is not going to be a breakthrough in this crisis.

Assuring passage of the austerity and privatization legislation in parliament was only the easy part. Given the waves of discontent being expressed by the so-called indignant citizens on Syntagma Square in Athens and trade unions’ militant industrial action, the subsequent implementation process will be severely challenged by different constituencies and thus risks being delayed or sabotaged.

Greek public and private sector unions hold a further 48-hour general strike this Tuesday and Wednesday, the fifth in 2011, after staging seven last year. The rolling strikes of the GENOP-DEH trade union at the Public Power Corp (PPC) against the government’s plan to reduce its shareholding from 51 percent to 34 percent is the initial litmus test of the privatization program. All aspects of the complex relationship between the government and trade unions in Greece are concentrated in this stand off.

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